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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT REFORM
The way we regulate California's

licensed professionals and tradespersons
makes little sense. We license people
-whether they are accountants, morticians, doctors, or lawyers-because we
believe that such licensees who are dishonest or incompetent will cause
irreparable harm. We tell people they
cannot become an accountant, mortician, doctor, or lawyer unless they pass
through an "entry barrier" and assure us
in advance of their likely honesty and
competence. We impose this "prior

restraint," generally disfavored in the
American model, because of the conse-

quences of dishonesty or incompetence
to the public.
It is ironic that in the two areas where
the potential for irreparable harm from

dishonesty or incompetence is most easily acknowledged-the medical and legal
professions-the initial licensing barriers to entry imposed by the state do not
address it effectively. As to honesty, the

screening process is of little use-very
few practitioners are eliminated on this

basis. Dishonesty is best dealt with by
license revocation and the deterrent
punch of criminal prosecution. It is not

easily predictable, and its absence cannot
be reliably assured by a written examination or a criminal record check at the age
of 25. As to competence, the state grants
a very basic license enabling a lawyer or

physician to practice in any aspect of the
profession. A person may be able to pass
a general bar examination in torts, contracts, and civil procedure, but know vir-

tually nothing about bankruptcy, immigration, tax, divorce, or other area of
specific practice. If a consumer goes to
an attorney for a bank-ruptcy, tax, or
other specific matter, the fact that the
practitioner has passed a general bar
exam at the age of 25 may be a sign of
general intelligence or understanding of
legal vocabulary, but it does not relate
directly to competence or knowledge in
the area of actual practice, upon which
the consumer relies.

The same lack of nexus holds true for
physician licensing. As far as the California Medical Board is concerned, a
licensed physician may perform as a
neurosurgeon, radiologist, proctologist,
anesthesiologist, or dermatologist.
Neither doctors nor lawyers are licensed
or LeLstU Jr. Leir spicMit"

This initial failure is baffling since
each area of law or medicine is separate
and distinct; persons cannot competently
practice in more than one or two areas,
and the skills and information required
for each are quite different. Yet, as far as
the state is concerned, one may practice
in any or all areas. After this abdication,
doctors and lawyers are not at any point
retested or required to demonstrate their
competence in their actual area of practice for the thirty to fifty years they practice. In addition, neither the legal nor
medical regulatory systems require malpractice insurance, or otherwise provide
for the assured recovery of damages
from incompetence that may be suffered
by consumers. In other words, although
the rationale for intrusive "prior
restraint" licensing of lawyers, physicians, and other professions is the prevention of irreparable harm flowing from
incompetence, the applicable regulatory
systems do not seriously address it.
The failure to assure honesty or competence at point of entry arguably imposes a special burden to provide that assurance through post-licensure discipline.
Where dishonesty or incompetence
occurs post facto, the raison d'etre of
regulation is manifest, and decisive,
quick public protection, including license
revocation or restriction, is compelled.
Where there is cause to believe that
licensed physicians or other professionals are dishonest or incompetent, the
discipline systems work under standard
procedures dictated by an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) common in
most states, including California.' These
acts are designed to afford due process
by specifying procedures for administrative adjudicative hearings and for their
judicial review. Unfortunately, this process has evolved into a series of con-

fused hearings and review where unqualified people make inconsistent decisions, which are then purportedly reconciled by review in yet another series of
dilatory steps. While this seven- to
eleven-year minuet is danced, interim
remedies to suspend, restrict, or review
licenses to protect the public are nonexistent or ineffectual. The obligation to
assure honesty and competence implicit
in a decision to license is betrayed by an
impotent and irrational Rube Goldberg
procedure. Let's review how it works.

Our Adjudicative System
(1) The Discipline Hearing. First,
there is an evidentiary hearing on the
agency level. The presiding officer is
usually a professional administrative law
judge (ALJ), either from the independent
Office of Administrative Hearings within
state government or one employed
directly by the agency performing the
administrative enforcement itself. Sometimes (but rarely) an agency head or
board will decide to hear a case and
judge it directly itself. When the agency
does this, it will use an ALJ to make
legal rulings, but the agency head or
licensing board (or a committee thereof)
makes the decision (findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and punishment).
Where the agency itself hears the
case, the panel of "judges" is usually a
board, commission, or committee of
appointed officials who direct the agency.
Although the ALJ who rules on objections and evidence is generally a professional with a legal background, the findings of fact and the actual discipline, i.e.,
the adjudicatory order, will be entered by
the commission, board, committee, or
agency director, not by the ALJ.
(2) Agency Review. Most often, however, an ALJ working alone presides
over the disciplinary hearing. The extreme part-time format of most state
commissions and boards compels the
use of ALJs to handle the initial hearing.
However, under the APA as it exists in
most states, the board, commission, or
agency may then review this decision;
indeed, the AL's opinion is merely a
"proposed" decision to the agency. The
agency may adopt the proposed decision, reject it, or modify it. To alter the
decision, the agency may have to afford
an opportunity for oral argument, but the
part-time commission or board may
alter it as it sees fit. In its review of the
AL's proposed decision, the agency,
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board, commission, or director does not
hear the evidence directly. It revises a
decision based on a review of the
record, written briefs, and several minutes of oral argument.
(3) Judicial Review: Superior Court.
Perhaps because of a lack of confidence
in the agency's adjudication, the APAs
in virtually every state allow for judicial
review by a superior court of agency
final decisions. Any one of a large number of possible superior courts may
review the hearing transcript (and may
take additional evidence in unusual or
extraordinary cases) and re-evaluate the
entire matter on an "independent judgment" basis. That is, where a "vested
right" is at issue-almost always the
case in discipline matters-the court
looks at the record and is required to
"substitute its judgment" in interpreting
and applying the facts. The court may
uphold the agency decision, reject it, or
remand the case to the agency for further proceedings.
(4) Judicial Review: Court of
Appeal/Supreme Court. In California,
the matter may then be appealed to one
of six district courts of appeal. There, it
will be reviewed under a "substantial
evidence" test, i.e., the decision of the
superior court will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence (and
includes no critical legal errors). It then
may be reviewed by petition to the
California Supreme Court.
This process has serious problems.
First, it takes anywhere from seven to
eleven years. There is little opportunity
for interim suspension of an accused
licensee during this entire period.'
These individual proceedings have
their own respective deficiencies:
(1) The Discipline Hearing. If the
hearing is conducted by an AU, it is
usually one from a centralized Office of
Administrative Hearings. These judges
lack the prestige, independence, or trappings of the judiciary. They often lack
expertise in the subject matter at hand.
While the AU has knowledge of administrative law and administrative law
precedents, he/she may be assigned in
fragmented fashion to liquor license
cases, occupational health and safety
cases, water rights cases, complex discipline cases, et al., across a panoply of
subject areas. ALJs from such centralized offices do not know of each others'
decisions (which are generally not
reported formally), and lack consistency
and predictability in their decisions.
Where the administrative law judge

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

is, however, not from a centralized AL
office, but is a creature of the agency,
we encounter the problem of the agency/prosecutor hiring, promoting, and
supervising the judge. That is, the accuser and the judge are the same entity.
How fair can a hearing be if the judge
feels some responsibility for the decision to prosecute and is part of the prosecution team, especially when the judge
also functions-as here-as the jury?
The initial hearing is the one forum
where live testimony is most likely and
observing the demeanor of witnesses is
critical. It is where the "on-the-scene"
factfinding function of the adjudicator
takes place. It is here where the quality
hearing should be held. Is it possible to
have a defined group of persons in a
given agency who have requisite judicial independence, judicial and legal
skills, knowledge of precedents, and
required expertise? The answer is yes,
as we discuss below. But that is not what
we have.
(2) Agency Review. Although the
licensing agency (i.e., the board, commission, or director) does not hear the
evidence or make the initial recommendation, it reviews a proposed opinion and
is authorized to make the final decision.
The review process by this part-time
group of practitioners (with perhaps
some public members) generally
involves a partial review of the record by
some members of the board (sometimes
a task assigned to one member for a
given case), written briefs, and oral argument often lasting five to ten minutes.'
In most states, the governing boards
which regulate trades and professions
generally consist of people who are currently practicing the very trade or profession being regulated. The bias resulting
from this derivation may cut unjustly in
either of two directions. The member of
the profession may be so offended by the
behavior of one of his/her peers that the
punishment imposed may be excessive.
More likely, the natural rationalizing
process leads us to filter facts in sympathy with those with whom we identify.
This bias will lead the colleague of the
person accused into a more sympathetic
frame of mind about his/her wrongdoing
and its appropriate sanction.
Perhaps more important than bias is
the question of the competence of these
decisionmakers. As noted above, members of these boards and commissions at
the state level are volunteer part-timers.
They meet once a month or, in some
cases, once every three months. They are

Vol. 10, No. t (Winter 1990)

not professional adjudicators; as noted
above, they are usually members of the
profession or trade regulated by that
board. In their review function, they do
not directly see the witnesses or the evidence. They make their decisions with little knowledge of agency precedent, and
little knowledge of court decisions
reviewing similar judgments. They themselves are not schooled in the rules of evidence. In our court system, and for a good
reason, criminal sentences and civil
penalties are decided not by a jury, but by
a court, applying rules of law and
attempting to impose a consistency which
is the hallmark of an equitable judicial
system, i.e., people who commit similar
transgressions are treated similarly.
Amazingly, the power of this commission or board to review and overturn,
in a radical fashion, the AL who was
on-the-scene and who has at least some
legal training, is without the traditional
limitations of an appeal; the agency has
complete discretion to rewrite the ALl's
decision.4
One reported justification for allowing the agency board or commission this
discretion rests with its purported substantive "expertise". However, this
"expertise" is not necessarily on point.
Most discipline cases do not involve
esoteric questions of professional practice. Persons disciplined have often
committed offenses such as child molestation, drug dealing, and violent acts
against their patients or clients. Subtle
knowledge about the optimum surgical
procedure is not required to pass judgment as to the factual issues normally in
dispute. However, in the occasional case
where a technical matter is in dispute,
the expertise of the board or commission
rendering final review is very unlikely
to be "on point." The fact that a physician who practices neurosurgery is on a
regulatory board does not assure competent expertise on a technical question
involving violation by a psychiatrist,
internist, or even an orthopedic surgeon.
In summary, the final administrative
decision is made by a group of persons
with a vested interest in the profession,
and perhaps in the practices being disputed; very little knowledge of court
precedent reviewing related decisions;
very little knowledge of legal proceedings, including rules of evidence; and
who did not observe the witnesses
directly.
(3) Superior Court Review. The agency's "final decision" is then subject to a
writ of mandate procedure, usually
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involving "independent judgment"
review by one of over 1,000 superior
court judges. Here we have a reconsideration by someone schooled in the law,
precedent, and the rules of evidence.
However, the superior court judge lacks
expertise in the subject matter and
familiarity with the policies of the agency. Rather than delegating review to an
identified body of adjudicators who may
have both substantive and legal expertise and who handle all cases emanating
from a major agency, the system scatters
review to any one of hundreds of superior court judges whose calendars are full
of probate, criminal, and other nonadministrative matters.
Although it is possible for the superior court judge to hear additional (or
repetitive) evidence, this is usually not
the case. Rather, the superior court
judge exercises his/her "independent
judgment" in reviewing the transcript of
the proceedings before the administrative law judge and the entire "administrative record." This means that the
superior court judge is being asked to
substitute his/her judgment for the judgment of the administrative law judge
and, as with the agency review, without
seeing the demeanor of the witnesses or
directly confronting the evidence. That
such a course is dangerous and antithetical to basic principles of judicial resolution should be obvious.
(4) Court of Appeal. Once again, perhaps because the previous series of procedures is not considered trustworthy,
the respondent has the opportunity to
appeal the matter yet again to any one of
six different courts of appeal. Any number of three-judge panels sitting on a
rotating basis in any one of these courts
of appeal will receive the case and
review it under a "substantial evidence"
test. Because different panels in different courts of appeal sometimes disagree
on the application of standards and rules
of law, it is often necessary for the
Supreme Court to grant a petition for
review in order to reconcile them.
A Reform Proposal
The end result? The adjudicator in
this five-step system-which consumes
between seven and eleven years-lacks
expertise, independence, or both. However, it is possible to design a system
with a quality hearing and a quality
review-in two steps, consuming less
than eighteen months, conducted by per-

sons who are both expert and independent. It is also possible to create a system
which offers both on point legal and substantive expertise from a group of independent, competent adjudicators who
render consistent decisions, who know
each others' decisions, and who are
capable of issuing interim orders while
the litigation is proceeding to protect the
public (e.g., to suspend a license or to
impose supervision or other restrictions).
We have proposed such a system
concerning the discipline of attorneys,
who are generally not within the APA
rubric. California attorneys have accepted that system, and it is now successfully operating through SB 1498 (Presley)
(Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988). We
have proposed a somewhat similar system to revise the APA-governed discipline of physicians in California,
through SB 2375 (Presley). Using physician discipline as an example, our model
works as follows:
First, one of three designated expert
ALJs appointed to a Medical Quality
Panel (MQP) within the centralized
Office of Administrative Hearings
would preside over the disciplinary
hearing. The MQP ALJs would hear all
medical discipline cases. Hence, they
would become expert in the subject matter, familiar with each others' decisions,
and able to render a consistent and predictable outcome. Each would be
knowledgeable in administrative law
issues and familiar with court precedents. They would also have at least one
year of education in basic medical
courses-a working knowledge of pharmacological and medical terminology.
Replicating this example in other fields,
similar specialized panels or (where
only a small number of cases is likely)
an assigned judge with some expertise
in an agency's specific subject matter
could be created within a centralized
Office of Administrative Hearings.'
Next, our proposal calls for the ALJs
to have available to them panels of
expert witnesses. These persons may be
called by the ALJ himself/herself to
answer questions, clarify matters, or
comment on the testimony of other
expert witnesses. The contribution of
these expert witnesses would be "on the
record" and fully subject to cross-examination by all parties.
The advantage of such an expert
panel and its use by the ALJ should be
obvious. Where esoteric questions are at
issue, both sides usually call expert witnesses to testify. But it is sometimes dif-

ficult for a trier of fact to achieve complete understanding simply from the testimony of vigorously contending expert
witnesses hired by both sides. The
notion that two partisan presentations
-each excluding a substantial truth
which hurts their conclusion-leads
directly to the revelation of optimum
truth is a theory belied by human experience. However, where the adjudicator
has not only knowledge of the rules of
evidence, but of the basic terminology
and subject matter in dispute, and where
he/she is able to call an impartial expert
witness to answer questions, a more
informed decision is likely.
Our reform then provides for a "substantial evidence" judicial review by a
single assigned panel of appellate court
judges. The state Judicial Council (i.e.,
the Supreme Court) would direct these
cases consistently to the same group of
judges. Hence, rather than having to reconcile decisions among various courts
of appeal, the Supreme Court would
have to intervene only if there were
error in the first instance. Further, the
assignment to a single panel would
enhance consistency and predictability,
and would lead to greater expertise by
the reviewing court.
Our recent reforms enacted under SB
1498 (Presley) in California for the State
Bar have created a twelve- to eighteenmonth system. We removed the initial evidentiary hearing from the hands of 450
volunteer practicing attorneys and put it in
the hands of full-time, independent State
Bar Court Judges appointed directly by
the California Supreme Court. The administrative appeal is now referred to a fulltime three-judge panel also appointed by
the Supreme Court. The system now produces a high-quality hearing and a highquality review, consistency, predictability,
and adjudication by people with both
independence and expertise. It is a system
which should be the model for APA state
reform in general.
The ABA Model Under Discussion:
Heading the Wrong Way
The American Bar Association's
Administrative Law Section and others
have been considering a number of proposals for model APA reform.7 On at
least one point, the ABA's still-pending
recommendation for a model APA
includes some counterproductive features. It is the position of some scholars,
especially those with federal administra-
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tive law background, that ALJs should
be within the control of the agency conducting the decisionmaking process, that
they should make recommended decisions, and that these decisions should be
reviewed by the commission or board
with absolute discretion to alter-i.e.,
the current failed model. The reason for
this position taken by those in the ABA
section is puzzling.
The ABA's tentative position is based
on the following theory: agencies "make
policy" in two ways-through rulemaking (the adoption of generic standards
applicable to all licensees), and through
adjudication (the formulation and application of rules on an individual, caseby-case basis). The distinction between
rulemaking and adjudication is a difficult one. In fact, adjudications are often
a vehicle for policy change. A very
broad statute or rule which is adjudicated may establish a rule of law. Hence, to
the extent that the agency controls rulemaking and performs that quasi-legislative function, it must also control the
adjudicators-by controlling its ALJs
and by reviewing their decisions to
implement its policies.
Such a picture is interesting, but is
much divorced from the reality of state
administrative law. It suffers from the
following defects:
(1) The first problem is a conceptual
one. Would those proposing such a system agree that criminal cases should be
appealed for final resolution to the judiciary committees of the state legislature
(or of the U.S. Congress where federal
prosecutions are involved)? Certainly,
criminal prosecutions often involve
interpretations of the reach and nature of
the criminal statutes enacted by these
legislative bodies. However, few scholars would ever seriously recommend
such an alteration. This is because there
is, in fact, some qualitative difference
between quasi-legislative and quasiadjudicative functions in government. It
is simply not the job of legislators to
adjudicate. They are not good at it and
they are not constituted to do it. Many
of the same reasons leading us to that
conclusion also apply in the administrative law arena to agency commission
and board members, except that the reasons here are even more pronounced, as
discussed below.
(2) It is unclear why the proponents
feel so strongly that the agency must be
in control of these adjudications, where
under the current system of judicial
review, the entire matter is then trans-
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ferred to a superior court judge who will
exercise his/her independent judgment
as an adjudicator. The agency does not
have the last word anyhow.
(3) The picture presented by the
"agency-in-control-of-adjudications"
theorists is marred by a factual flaw. The
proponents assume that large numbers
of adjudications involve serious policy
questions. This is not the case at the
state level. Certainly there are such
adjudications, and these may properly
lead to changes in legislation or rulemaking where the adjudicative results
contravene legislative or regulatory
intent-as is normally the case. But the
vast majority of adjudications are just
that: adjudications. They attempt to
determine whether a standard or rule or
statute, which is reasonably well
defined, was violated by the respondent
(accused licensee). The function of these
adjudications is not to establish policy
so much as it is to determine (a) what
happened, and (b) the appropriate punishment. These judgments require
skilled factfinding, knowledge of the
rules of evidence, some expert knowledge where appropriate, and consistency
and predictability in judgment.
These are critical decisions involving
public protection and the livelihood of a
licensee whose future is at stake. They
are sobering decisions commanding
serious and effective procedures. The
people making them should know what
they are doing. They should should
know how to make them, and they
should have the independence to justify
the confidence of the public and the
accused. 'If one were to sit in on the
many adjudications occurring at the
state level, one would see that the issues
raised and skills required are not suited
to legislators, but to adjudicators in a
traditional sense.
(4) The ABA also overlooks the
nature of the decisionmakers on the state
level. Those in the ABA Administrative
Law Section who advocate agency control of adjudication are well familiar
with the federal system-where the
agencies, boards, or commissions are
run by professional full-time persons
subject to congressional oversight and
high visibility At the state level, these
conditions are generally not present.
Instead, state agency decisionmakers are
usually current members of the trade or
profession being regulated. They operate
out of the visibility of media attention or
public scrutiny, and they are volunteers
without legal or judicial experience.
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Although they may have a vested profitstake interest in the profession, they may
or may not have any expertise in the subject matter of a particular adjudication.
We may want (with hesitation) to vest
these people with some quasi-legislative
power. Part-time amateur legislatures are
part of the American tradition. But when
it comes to the adjudication of someone's right to practice, their possible
incarceration, or the imposition of a civil
or criminal fine, we turn to professional
adjudicators for good reason.
There are others who object to the
reforms we have proposed. Chiefly, they
consist of those from the industries and
trades which may be affected. These
"special interests" argue for maximum
"due process," the weakening of discipline and the interim remedy powers of
any entity, and control of adjudications
by practitioners who are politically
active in the state, preferably operating
at the local level in "peer review."
These persons seek a kind of
"medieval guild" where the members of
the profession or trade determine who is
in it and how they are to be treated.
These proponents have largely determined the system currently in effect.
Decisions are made by persons who are
colleagues or competitors of the
accused-in either case, an unacceptable bias in a serious adjudication. We
have a process where there is no expertise/independence combined, and where
expertise-to the extent it does exist-is
rarely relevant to the issues in a given
adjudication. We have a system which
lasts anywhere from seven to eleven
years (where resisted by a respondent).
We have no entity with the experience,
expertise, self-confidence, or authority
to issue interim suspension orders or
other license restrictions to protect the
public as litigation proceeds.
The end result of the current system
is a fraud on the public. It is a system of
purported public protection pursuant to
state APAs which are actually a cartel
recipe for inaction. The output of state
agency discipline systems, even those
regulating professions where irreparable
harm is a very real danger (e.g.,
medicine), is pathetic. In 1987 (the last
year for which such figures are available), the national average of state disciplinary actions per 1,000 doctors in the
United States was 2.78. California is an
example of the failure of the APA process. In California during 1987-88 (the
last year for which this statistic is available), 715 physicians suffered malprac-
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tice judgments or agreed to malpractice
settlements in excess of $30,000. These
are not merely accusations or cases
filed: they are substantial judgments
and/or settlements-many of them in
the millions of dollars. The level is a
record number, up 50% from two years
before. Also in 1987-88, the hospital
privileges of 249 physicians were
revoked for incompetence. During that
same time period, the number of physicians publicly disciplined by the
Medical Board for incompetence
-- either by public reprimand, suspension, or revocation-amounted to 12.
Litigation of the average discipline
case takes over seven years from the act
giving rise to discipline to final
resolution. And during this interim, the
number of physicians subject to interim
suspension over the last three years?
Trivial. In California, that number is
three-approximately one per year.
The number of complaints flowing
into the physician discipline system continues to increase. After initial filtering,
those with facial merit and within the
jurisdiction of the Medical Board
amounted to 4,800 in 1989. The number
anticipated for this year? Over 6,000.
One does not have to be a sophisticated
mathematician or actually review the
failure of the system in microcosm, as
those of us at the Center have done on
many occasions, to see the complete
failure of the current system of detection, investigation, and APA adjudication. Nor does the minor tinkering proposed by the ABA Administrative Law
Section address the issue squarely, or
with the appropriate diagnosis or prescription.
The creation of a system which
works is not that difficult, absent the
political power of the cartels manipulating the current celebration of impotence.
It is not an arrangement over which reasonable persons should be differing. The
reforms needed should be supported by
scholars, responsible professionals, and
the public in order to fulfill the promise
and purpose of the regulation of our
trades and professions: the protection of
the public and the discipline, restriction,
or excision of those who, because of
their dishonesty or incompetence,
threaten irreparable harm to the consuming public.
FOOTNOTES
1. Government Code § 11500 et seq.

Some professions, including attorneys,
have generally created their own administrative procedures separate from the
generic administrative procedure acts of
the various states, but most of these sui
generis systems have defects similar to
those described in this commentary.
2. In APA-governed administrative
proceedings, interim suspension is normally obtained by a separate motion for
temporary restraining order (TRO) or
preliminary injunction to one of a large
number of superior court judges rotating
through the law and motion departments
of the superior courts of our counties.
These judges have heavy caseloads,
know little about the trade or profession,
and receive few cases involving interim
suspension of an occupational license in
general. They are extremely hesitant to
interim suspend or to otherwise limit
practice for public protection, and years
of lack of success have led to abandonment of the attempt. For example, the
California Medical Board obtains
approximately one interim suspension
order each year against a practicing
physician.
3. During argument, board or commission members frequently ask questions inappropriate for a legal argument-including factual questions
which are often answered on a hearsay
basis by counsel who are not under oath.
4. A normal appeal consists of written briefs and oral argument to a reviewing court, which decides whether there
are "errors of law" or whether there is
"substantial evidence" to support findings. However, the agency review of an
ALJ's decision is without limitations.
The ALJ's decision is only "proposed"
to the agency, and it may change it even
if there is substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's findings and no errors
of law. A change may require opportunity (albeit brief) for written and oral
argument, but the agency's director,
board, or commission may and often
does alter these decisions without directly hearing the evidence.
5. As noted in note 2, supra, this
large group of undifferentiated superior
court adjudicators is also relied upon for
interim suspension decisions.
6. This option is superior to the
assignment of these cases to ALJs within the control of the agency itself. There
is no reason why an independent Office
of Administrative Hearings cannot
assign panels or individual judges to
hear all of the cases in a particular subject area for consistency and expertise

purposes. The outcome for such an
arrangement combines both independence and expertise.
7. See, e.g., Asimow, Updating
California Administrative Law,
California Regulatory Law Reporter
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) at I.
8. Note that federal agency adjudications also involve more policy-laden
issues. A stark example is the Federal
Trade Commission, where cease and
desist orders (adjudications) and trade
regulation rules interplay in defining a
very broad statute prohibiting "unfair"
business practices (section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act). In general, state adjudications take place in a
substantially more defined legal setting,
where the rule or policy is not seriously
in dispute or altered by the process.

THE PROBLEM WITH
PROPOSITIONS
At the outset, we must understand the
difference between a constitution and
our statutes. The former is designed to
define the basic rules of the game.
Included in those rules are measures to
protect minorities from the abuses of a
tyrannical "majority". Termed "ochlocracy" by political scientists, this abuse
occurs where a "mob-like" majority
imposes its will unfairly on a powerless
minority. The constitutional structure's
check impedes the majority governing
the legislative and executive branches
from trammeling the basic rights of a
minority. Yes, the majority governs, but
there are some limits. To go beyond
those limits, one must alter the very fabric of the rules of the game: the constitutional document. Since a constitution is,
then, a document preserving core rights
from popular abridgment and delineating the checks and balances precluding
tyranny, it should be altered only in
extremis.
In California and in many other
states, the constitution may be altered by
a vote of the people, either proposed by
the legislature or directly by a petition
initiative. Statutes may also be enacted
or altered by the same basic process: an
initiative proposed by petition and voted
upon directly by the electorate. This initiative-by-petition option is considered
by many to be an important escape
valve, a popular check against the cor-
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ruption of majoritarian rule in the legislature. If special interests control the legislature contrary to the will of the
People, the People can act directly.
There is little doubt but that institutional
corruption of state legislatures, including
California's, justifies a check in the form
of democratic redress directly to the
People. However, what is happening in
California is the use of this mechanism
to bypass the state legislature in many
problem areas where the legislative process is designed to produce-at least in
theory-a more considered result. And
the initiative process is increasingly used
in the rewriting of the very basic constitutional document itself.
A great deal of legislation and constitutional amendment has occurred
through direct vote of the people. The
November 1988 election included over
twenty initiatives. Five separate propositions covered alternative prescriptions
for insurance/tort reform. One of them
was 120 pages long. We outline below
some of the problems with initiatives.
We conclude that it is too difficult for
the majority to win in the legislative
process-whether through initiative or
act of the legislature-and too easy for
the populace to change the constitution.
The survival of a democracy depends
upon an uncluttered, clear constitutional
fabric which is not easy to change, but
which guarantees the proper functioning of the institutions reflecting the
popular will, subject to specific constitutional protections. What has happened, instead, is that the legislature has
fallen into the hands of special interests
and, in order to overcome that roadblock, citizen groups have sought legislative and extensive constitutional
revision by ballot. However, they have
done so in a process fraught with error
and excess. And they now do so in an
environment where access to this "citizens' forum" increasingly depends
upon the same kind of special interest
money domination now corrupting the
legislature.
Constitutional Change Is Too Easy
In 1990, changing a statute by initiative requires 372,678 valid petition signatures. A constitutional change
requires 595,485 signatures. Those signatures are no longer gathered by volunteers in the field, but by professionals
paid by those proposing the initiatives,
i.e., those with sufficient money to hire
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the signature gatherers. The difference
between a statutory initiative and a constitutional change, in practical terms, is
$400,000 instead of $600,000. Once the
signatures are gathered and the proposal
put to the electorate, a majority vote
enacts a statutory or constitutional
change. The cost difference, then, represents the delineation between the
majoritarian legislative function and
constitutional alteration.
The direct result of making the constitution this easy to amend is a long
series of silly provisions. Is it really
necessary that the California Constitution provide for the continuation of
rights for Stanford University and the
Huntington Library and Art Gallery
(Article IX, Sections 9 and 15)? Why
do we sandwich between a guarantee
that the state constitution shall include,
on its own basis, the federal bill of
rights (Article I, Section 24) and the
admonition that the words of the constitution are mandatory (Article I, Section
26) a constitutional right to fish on public land (Article 1, Section 25)? Is it
really necessary to include the authority
to issue securities for public parking
(Article XVI, Section 15)? Although we
gratefully acknowledge the repeal of
provisions requiring the regulation of
wrestling, development of the San
Joaquin River, and money related to
crustacean sales, is it really necessary
that provisions relating to our alcoholic
beverage regulatory system (Article
XX, Section 22), our horse racing regulatory system (Article IV, Section 19),
street car companies (Article XIII,
Section 19), or, for heaven's sake, tax
exemptions for Cogswell Polytechnical
College (Article XIII, Section 4) clutter
our state constitution? There are many
examples, but we offer these to illustrate what has become of what is supposed to be a ringing document-the
architecture of our democracy-the
exultation of our republic.
Moreover, once subject matter
becomes introduced into the constitution, its alteration then depends upon
constitutional amendment. Hence, the
constitution increasingly becomes the
forum for what should be legislative discourse. And changing it becomes a practical necessity to update and adjust it to
different conditions and needs. That
necessity requires convenient ease of
process. Ease of process opens the document to threats to its basic protections-where it reposes our most cherished values.
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Legislation: Too Hard to Enact
A lot of bills are introduced in
Sacramento--over 5,000 bills per session at the current rate. There are 800
full-time, professional lobbyists representing profit-stake interests there as
well-six for every legislator. These
persons are well paid by over 2,000
major trade associations. The existence
of campaign contribution corruption and
the honoraria debacle are part of the
problem. The money now flowing in
Sacramento buys access, and accessparticularly at the early stage of a proposal-wins an early commitment.
Legislators, like most other people, do
not like changing their minds publicly.
The early commitment often prevails.
Legislators, at least indirectly, respond
to money.
Money governs in Sacramento: it is
able to stop most serious reform, and is
often able to perpetrate its own affirmative corruption. The People have, in a
real sense, lost their legislature.
The loss of the legislature has been
assisted ably by its own fragmented
structure, allowing members and party
leadership to evade responsibility for
their nonfeasance. Members of the legislature are truly not held responsible for
their failure to vote in committee-and a
failure to vote counts as a "no" vote.
Low legislative pay, the committee
structure, excessive flow of bills (many
trivial or insincerely offered), uncertain
attendance at committee meetings where
critical votes occur, and lack of accountability all coalesce to magnify the effect
of money.
A significant contributing factor is
the failure of California's media to cover
its own government. In late 1989, the
last television/radio journalists pulled
out of Sacramento. Oh, one crew
returned when a Sacramento landlady
was discovered with grisly bodies in her
back yard. But allocation of the state's
$53 billion in tax monies and action on
laws determining criminal justice, environmental protection, consumer rights,
child health, education, medical care
and welfare? Well, those have taken
third seat as media journalists rush to
copy each other's bizarre story selection
biases.. .rock star Billy Idol falls off a
motorcycle, Cher's newest boyfriend,
and Zsa Zsa Gabor.
Accountability is sure to be missing
when the media fails. Our journalists
have turned the six o'clock news into a
combination of "Lifestyles of the Rich
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and Famous" and "That's Incredible."
Our newspapers (what few are left)
restrict any non-Sunday commentary to
750 words ... that's right.. .750 words
period. Even that is deep thought for
television-which operates on the
assumption that the citizenry's attention
span cannot possibly exceed ten seconds.
But beyond money corruption, lack
of accountability, and media abdication
is an even more basic infirmity: a structural requirement for a two-thirds vote
to prevail over special interests in critical areas! There is a two-thirds vote
requirement for any appropriation,
including any measure which might
involve a minimal additional expenditure by local government. While it is
inappropriate for the state to continue to
demand services by local government
without allocating revenues for their
provision, it is also ridiculous to require
a two-thirds vote for every measure
which has only an ancillary and trivial
fiscal impact. Yet, if one wishes to
change, e.g., a misdemeanor offense to a
felony, the California legislative counsel
will invariably advise that it may have a
fiscal impact and thus require a twothirds vote.
Further, the two-thirds vote requirement applies to the elimination of a tax
loophole. The theory here is that the
elimination of a tax loophole involves
someone who must now pay more taxes.
Hence, to that person, there has been a
tax increase. And since there is a tax
increase, it is a revenue matter requiring
a two-thirds vote. Since special interests
have achieved numerous loopholes
enabling them to receive public services
while the rest of us pay the bill, they are
quite happy that this protection from
majoritarian rule protects them.
Problems With Initiatives
The lack of public control over our
own legislature contributes to the proliferation of both legislative and constitutional provisions by initiative. But the
proposition process carries with it common flaws. First, none of the propositions
proposed may be changed midstream.
The initiative is drafted; submitted to the
Attorney General to draft a summary
statement; and then, in whatever form
originally drafted, is circulated for petition and submitted to voters. No matter
how ridiculous a provision, no matter
how unconstitutional a clause, no matter
how much its sponsors agree and would

want to change or amend the measure, it
is locked in exactly as drafted.
Few initiatives ever proposed or
enacted by California voters, or by the
legislature, have been optimally formulated in their first draft. Almost all measures reaching the legislature are legitimately and properly altered in the legislative process. Certainly there are bad
changes too-and documents accommodating too many interests often emerge
as meaningless pap. But the other
extreme has comparable abuse: an oversight, mistake, or ambiguity which cannot be corrected even where all concemed will it. The drafters of an initiative, whether it be an ambiguous provision in Proposition '103 or the obviously
unconstitutional structure of Proposition
13, are locked into their originally-submitted draft version for all time.
Second, the "single subject rule,"
which requires that an initiative concern
a single subject, is now defined so broadly by the Supreme Court that virtually
anything can be packaged with anything
else.' Hence, special interests may
attack disfavored groups such as attorneys or loggers, and use jabs at them to
enact distantly related provisions attractive to the special interest sponsor. For
example, the insurance industry in its
1988 Proposition 104 advertised a "nofault" system, attacking excessive attorney fees and promising quicker claim
settlements. But less than 10% of the
120-page initiative even addressed nofault. The remainder would have accomplished quite different objectives (including ensconcing the industry's exemption
from federal and state antitrust law such
that a two-thirds legislative vote would
be required to subject them to meaningful competition).
Third, and perhaps most important, a
dangerous game is now being played.
Statewide initiatives are proposed not
from volunteer effort, but are hired out for
money. One drafts an initiative to raise
substantial money, whether it be an
increased tax on a disfavored item or a
commitment from existing general fund
monies. Then the proponent goes to
groups who want that additional money.
These prospective beneficiaries are asked:
"If you contribute X amount of money to
the gathering of signatures, we can leverage it into much more money from the
public trough for your group." Hence,
from this process, those who are able to
afford $100,000-300,000 in contributions
obtain the promise of millions (even hundreds of millions) of dollars of public

monies through the initiative process.
The current constitutional (Gann)
limit on state spending only accentuates
likely misallocation from this mechanism. For a constitutional initiative is
now required to waive that limit for
extra money, or to reserve a given percentage of existing general fund money
for a designated beneficiary (as with
1988's Proposition 98 designating 40%
of the state budget for education).
Some groups who are the most
deserving are unable to ante up any
money to finance signatures. For example, preschool children whose health and
safety is in disrepair in California have
no representatives to buy a piece of the
initiative pie. This "bidding" for the
spoils of a money-generating initiative
is the newest game in town. Ironically, it
is a game those who are without special
interest influence may be compelled to
play. Undesirable as it is, an initiative
may be the only way to raise money for
the politically (financially) weak. As
noted, the legislature's general fund is
constricted by the Gann initiative, limiting the total amount of money which
may be spent by the state. For those in
need, there is no choice but to either
climb above the Gann limit through an
initiative, or submit to the legislative
process for limited money-against 800
lobbyists with honking beaks like young
robin chicks in the nest.
The generation of any substantial
money through the legislature to solve a
serious problem of the powerless means
affirmatively taking public funds from
existing powerful recipients. This is
because prior propositions and commitments reserving tax revenues for predetermined purposes now lock up the vast
majority of the state budget (education,
special funds, criminal justice, MediCal, et al.). The initiative process is
increasingly limited to those with
money for signature-gathering to qualify
the measure. But the legislative process
demands even greater financial contributions for a piece of the highly competitive and limited state general fund.
The proposition campaigns themselves are frenzied exercises in "big lie"
demagoguery. Ads involve only simplistic sloganeering and attempts to associate the other side with reviled occupations or symbols. Here, the media is at
its brain-dead worst-taking money to
purvey deceit, spouting the first amendment, and examining, puncturing, or
covering very little of it-beyond the de
rigeur horserace polling stories about
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who is ahead. [An exception has been
Harvey Rosenfield. But Harvey's publicity stunt genius is the exception proving the rule. He demonstrates what one
has to do to raise a substantial issue.
Regrettably, the media does not have
room for more than one Harvey.]
What we have in the end is a mess.
We have a constitution which is cluttered with trivia. We have too many
attempts to alter the constitution. The
more the attempts succeed, the more
future societal change must come from
constitutional revision. As to the citizen's initiative check on the legislature,
monied interests are now poised to capture that mechanism as well; it is
increasingly less likely to produce
redress for the People, and more likely
to produce an unjust or unworkable
result.
The solution must be to confine our
initiatives and to focus our energies on
constitutional restructuring to make the
legislature a real legislative body. It
should represent a majoritarian interest
(that is what it is designed to do), and
respond on the merits based on facts and
defensible human values-not in vectorlike fashion to money. It must be able to
accomplish insurance and tort reform,
restore tax equity, rewrite physician discipline procedures, resolve pressing
child health and safety issues, and make
other tough choices on behalf of diffuse
or powerless interests and against the
economic interests of the powerful. The
constitutional changes that are needed to
create a neutral and responsible legislature are included, albeit in a somewhat
compromised format, in the Clean
Government Initiative now being circulated for voter signature. This initiative
bans honoraria, creates public financing
of campaigns with spending limitations,
and momentously limits the influence of
the political action committees. This
provision doesn't go quite far enough,
but it goes a long way. It is the kind of
provision which must be in our constitution, and which can only get there
through citizen action, given the conflicts of interest paralyzing legislative
self-reform. A defensible proposition
should set ground rules to ensure that
the majoritarian organs of government
function as intended. Once such a legislature is in place, the citizenry need not
vindicate its grievances through the initiative process; the legislature will do
the job properly. Then the People will
be well justified in summarily rejecting
attempts to legislate-and especially to
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alter the constitution-by initiative, and
a sensible constitutional balance may be
restored.
FOOTNOTES
1. The recent upholding of
Proposition 105 is an illustration of the
extent to which the law has gone in
allowing flexibility in initiative proposals. Here, we have a proposition whose
only binding glue is the "consumer's
right to know." The proposition requires
disclosure of information concerning
toxic chemicals in food, investments in
South Africa, and other information
totally unrelated substantively or by any
policy commonality. In upholding it, the
courts have called into question any
remaining viability to the "single subject" restriction.

Vol. 10, No. I (Winter 1990)

